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Abstract 
Motivated by the revealed preference approach to consumer theory, this study constructs 
a dynamic theoretical model which infers the unobservable household behavior from the 
observable patterns of housing and mortgage market activities. The model emphasizes the 
role of asymmetric responses of sellers in different phases of a housing market cycle in 
generating certain price and volume patterns. Such role has so far largely been ignored in 
both theoretical and empirical studies of housing markets. The model also establishes, 
theoretically, multiple channels via which housing and mortgage markets interact and via 
which speculative forces are propagated. In addition, it generates a testable result 
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regarding the stability of the system formed by the two markets, which may be extended 
by endogenizing some important policy instruments. 
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I. Introduction 
Recent experiences by European and North American countries, again, confirm the 
existing wisdom: periodically unsustainable growths in housing and mortgage markets 
sew the seeds of financial crisis and economic distress (see (Qin Xiao, 2005) Ch. 1 for a 
long list of references on this subject). The referred unsustainable growths are often cited 
as results of speculation ((Qin Xiao, 2010) gives a more in-depth discussion and more 
references on this topic). The objective of the current study is to capture some important 
characteristics of a speculative community and the implications of such characteristics on 
the stability of housing and mortgage markets, via the construct a hypothetic community. 
The members of this community are entirely driven by their desire to profit from buying 
and selling assets, rather than from producing goods and services. Although producing 
nothing and being small in size, this community is highly influential on the much larger 
production community within which it resides. We will henceforth call the former the 
financial economy and the latter the real economy. The activities in the financial 
economy are vital parts of a process which determines the allocation of scarce resources 
in the real one. When in moderation, these activities will ensure that resources are 
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directed to the most productive sectors in the real economy; when in excess, they do quite 
the contrary, as has been witnessed by many countries around the world in the past 
century (C. P.  Kindleberger, 2005, Q. Xiao, 2005, Qin Xiao, 2010). 
Within this financial economy, for its sheer size, housing asset perhaps exerts the most 
influence on the real economy.i Nonetheless, our understanding of this asset market at a 
macro-level is so far mostly based on households utility maximization, branched out from 
the standard theory of consumer choices (see for example (J. Y. Campbell and J. F. 
Cocco, 2007, J. F. Cocco, 2005, M. Flavin and T. Yamashita, 2002, M. Iacoviello, 2004)). 
Alternatively, it is treated like stocks and bonds using the present-value approach. Either 
way, the supply of housing is usually assumed to be fixed hence left out of the picture 
(except in a few papers, see for instance (Edward L. Glaeser et al., 2008, James M. 
Poterba, 1984) whose merits and drawbacks will be discussed in the next section).Yet, 
housing does not bear close comparison with food, or clothes, or refrigerator, or even cars, 
nor is it close in characteristics to stocks and bonds. On the one hand, it does deliver 
consumables which generate pleasure the way food and clothes do; on the other hand, it 
stores value in a way no ordinaryii food or clothes can possibly manage. It is, in most 
cases, the only significant asset a household will ever acquire in its lifetime (Stephanie 
Curcuru, John Heaton, Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore, 2004). Furthermore, this asset 
is distinctively different from stocks and bonds: it is heterogeneous; it is lumpy; and in 
most cases its acquisition would not be possible without the financial backup of a 
mortgage.  
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II. Stylized Facts 
The housing market is cyclical with irregularities so far deemed by the real estate 
community as unpredictable. However, there are some facts about such cycle which are 
fairly predictable. It has been observed that, in a market in which confidence is crumbling, 
to-be house owners often postpone previously planned purchases in anticipation of future 
price decline; on the contrary, when optimism is running high, anxious to-be owners 
bring forward purchase plans in expectation of future price increases. These expectations 
accelerate price changes both on the price’s rising and falling phase, but in an asymmetric 
manner, partly because of sellers’ behaviors. House-owners are loss-averse (D. Genesove 
and C. Mayer, 2001). In a falling market, sellers’ resistance to sell at a loss helps to slow 
down the speed of price sliding. On the other hand, when the market is rising, sellers’ 
resistance to sell in anticipation of even higher future prices simply adds fuel to the flame. 
In a recent study, Haurin et al. (Donald R.  Haurin et al., 2010) shows that households 
sentiment on good-time-to-buy (GTTB) moved more or less in line with that on good-
time-to-sell (GTTS) before the most recent housing market downturn in the United States. 
Thereafter, GTTB has changed little while GTTS has dropped dramatically. Such swings 
in sentiments are manifested by the large decrease in housing transaction volumes in both 
UK and US in the recent downturn, especially in UK where house price declines have 
been modest compared to the experiences of US during the same period (figure 7 and 8).  
The discussion above implies that housing supply plays a key role ⎯ which has so far 
largely been ignored by the literature. In many cases, housing supply has been implicitly 
assumed to be fixed. The fixity of housing supply (or at least the growth rate of housing 
supply) is not entirely an absurd assumption if housing supply is identical to housing 
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stock. Historical data show that, in countries like UK or US where the urbanization 
process has long reached a stable equilibrium state, the growth in housing stock is one per 
cent per annum or less (refer to Communities and Local Government websiteiii for UK 
housing statistics, or U.S. Census Bureau’s American Housing Survey for US housing 
statistics, or CEIC Database for both).  Given the depreciation rate of a similar figure 
(Brent C Smith, 2004), treating the value of total housing stock as fixed would not be too 
far from the truth. The fact is, however, at any time only a small fraction (typically less 
than 10 per centiv) of the housing stock is being actively traded, and that fraction varies 
greatly at different phases of a market cycle (see figure 1). As far as the researcher is 
aware, the existing literature on housing market either does not make this distinction 
(James M. Poterba, 1984) or, if it does, treats the fraction of existing stock on-sale as a 
constant number (Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko and Albert Saiz, 2008). The author 
will show in this paper that variations in the existing supply are important reasons behind 
some observed patterns in the housing market, for instance the growth in house price at 
different stages of a market cycle.  
The previously described market phases are usually associated with very high volatilities 
in price and transaction volume. Such high volatility is a result of great uncertainty, 
market anxiety as well as controversial beliefs held by market participants: has the price 
risen or fallen enough? is the market due for correction? is an observed market correction 
a temporary market confusion, or a signal that the tide is now turning? As neither 
pessimists nor optimists dominate the market in these phases, we would observe scores of 
participants buying as well as scores of participants selling. The price therefore swings 
violently as these heterogeneous participants trade actively on their widely-parted beliefs. 
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There are two other phases of a market cycle which must not be left out of the picture. On 
approaching the peak of a cycle, a housing market is characterized by stagnation in 
trading volumes, coupled sometimes by continued price hikes.  Part of the explanation of 
this phenomenon lies in information uncertainty. At the peak, the buyer with the highest 
willingness and ability to pay has already paid the price and is in possession of the 
housing asset he/she desired. But this information is unknown to the sellers. On 
observing the high selling price, the next seller simply wishes to snatch an even higher 
one. So he pitches the price of his house at a higher or similar level and wait for the buyer 
to arrive. But that buyer will not come, not now. On approaching the trough, both price 
and volume tend to be stagnant. The seller who has the lowest reservation price has 
already sold his/her house. But the buyers have no way of observing this information. 
They wait and wait, for the next seller with an even lower reservation price, until their 
patience runs out. The market tide turns around! In these two phases, low volatility is 
characteristic of the market because of greater unanimity among market participants. At 
near the peak, even the above average optimists are gradually concerted to believe that 
the price is due for a downward correction; at near the trough, even the above average 
pessimists are gradually persuaded that the price is due for an upward correction. The 
price quiets down as market beliefs converge. 
To sum up, a housing market cycle has four phases: a booming phase featured by fast 
price growths and high market volatility; an over-heating phase by stagnant or falling 
trading volume (accompanies by either stagnant or rising price); a collapsing phase where 
both price and volume are falling; and a recovering phase where volume picks up 
gradually with price to follow. These descriptions are visualized in figure 2 and 3, with 
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figure 2 the styled and figure 3 the actually observed price-volume co-movement for 
England and Wales, and the four different regions in the US. 
The four phases together paint out the major trend of a housing market cycle. The 
movement along this trend is, however, not linear but cyclical itself (see figure 3). How 
do we then understand these observations using the established economic framework? 
One possibility is to explain the market as in disequilibrium or in adjustment towards a 
single equilibrium. However, this disequilibrium market can definitely not explain the 
existence of an overheating market (refer to figure 4). Another possibility is to describe 
the market as in continuous equilibrium, guaranteed by price adjustment, or as in 
adjustment from multiple short-run equilibria to a single long-run equilibrium. This 
scenario is depicted in figure 5, which looks explaining the four-phase cycle fairly 
comfortably. The intuitions behind the existence of a continuous equilibrium market lies 
in differentiating between potential and active traders, or future and current 
demand/supply. The current price is driven by the current active traders and reflects the 
current demand and supply. Furthermore, it reveals the preferences of the current buyer 
and seller, not of those who are looking to trade but have found the price unattractive ⎯ 
least of all of those who have not even thought about participating in the market. An 
analogy can be drawn from the labor market, where the current wage reveals the 
preferences of those who are employed, but not of those who are in the labor force but 
unemployed, and not of those who have no intention of joining the labor force in any 
foreseeable future. The implied time paths of price and volume of this continuous 
equilibrium scenario is shown in figure 6, which does not seem to contradict the picture 
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shown in figure 7 and 8 which paint the observed time paths for house price and sales 
volume in US, England and Wales.  
Another empirical observation is that mortgage debt often moves in tandem with the 
housing market (see figure 7 and 8). Such observations have to do with the fact that 
mortgage debt is a secured debt: it is secured by the housing asset associated with it. 
Therefore, when the housing market is on the rise, the value of the security increases 
which improves the balance sheet of a bank and increases the capacity and willingness of 
the bank to lend (Q. Xiao, 2005, Qin Xiao, 2010). The in-tandem movement of housing 
market and mortgage market can be partly understood with the help of figure 9 (adopted 
from (Robert M. Buckley, 1982)), which connect the housing market to the mortgage 
market via the interest rate. This adopted analytic framework can be used for comparative 
static analysis, for instance, the equilibrium-to-equilibrium implication of a more elastic 
mortgage and housing supply on house price and sales volume.  
However, the graphical analytical frameworks described above cannot easily be adapted 
to explain the cyclicality of the housing market along the trend (figure 3), least can it be 
easily twisted to capture the other channels via which the housing asset and the mortgage 
market connect and interact. A mathematical model in this case will prove handy. The 
discussions above suggest that the growth of the housing and the mortgage markets 
depend on the level of the house price, the speed of change of this price, as well as their 
expected future values. Therefore, a dynamic higher-order differential equation model 
looks fitting the bill (refer to (Alpha C. Chiang, 1984) p.529-30). 
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III. A Dynamic Model of Housing and Mortgage Markets 
Following the spirit of ceteris paribus analysis, the current model will adopt a partial 
dynamic analysis. The analysis is partially, as opposed to fully, dynamic because that 
every variable will be treated as exogenously given except for house price, house 
transaction volume and mortgage debt. The purpose of this stylization is to decipher 
households’ price-expectation-formation and speculation in driving housing and 
mortgage markets, and the implications of these on the stability of the system formed by 
the two markets.  
The approach taken in this model is bottom-upv in the sense it follows the line of thoughts 
in the theory of revealed preferences. Economics 101 teaches us that demand and supply 
in a market determines the price and quantity of the good traded in that market. Neither 
demand nor supply is observable. For instance, in a housing market, we observe prices 
and volumes of housing transactions, not the demand for and the supply of houses; in a 
mortgage market, we observe mortgage rates and households secured debts, but not the 
demand for and the supply of housing debt. The existing literature, in general, takes a 
top-down approach. For example, in the consumption approach to housing market, a 
consumer utility function (an unobservable) is first specified; a demand function (another 
un-observables) is then deduced from that utility function; the implication of these 
unobservable on prices and quantities (the observables) are derived thereafter. The 
current study will take the reverse route and ask the question: what if any do the 
observables tell us about the un-observables? To be more specific, what can we say about 
the underlying parameters governing households’ behavior, by observing price and 
quantity? If the observations imply that the system can remain on an explosive path for a 
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significant period of time, what market forces are holding up and prolonging this 
unsustainable development? 
A. Demographic and Housing Tenure Distribution 
Consider a hypothetic economy. In this economy, the only consumption taking place is 
housing consumption, and the only production is housing production. Assume that at any 
point in time there are T generations of N households in total, with N and T exogenously 
given as the demographics of this economy is in a stationary statevi. Denote the new-born 
generation as generation 0 and the oldest as generation T-1. Each generation has n 
households with n = N/T, who lives for exactly T periods. A constant fraction λvii, 
λ∈(0,1), of the n households in each generation will own housing asset once in its 
lifetime. We call these λn households in each generation owners and the remaining ones 
renters. When living in a rental house, that house is rented from a single absentee 
landlord; when buying a housing asset, that purchase is finances at least partly by an 
absentee financier. In the spirit of comparative analysis, we assume, one, owners and 
renters of the same generation are homogenous in every way except for their tastes for 
ownership of housing assets; two, renters are homogenous within and across generations; 
and three, owners are identical within one generation but heterogeneous across 
generations. This cross-generation difference, as will be shown later, is what generates 
certain observed patterns in the markets of concern.  
At any time, owners can be classified as buyers, holders, or sellers of housing assets 
(refer to figure 10 for a graphical display of the demographic and tenure pattern of a non-
speculative economy). At any time, buyers and sellers of housing assets are small in 
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number compared with the size of the population. Nonetheless it is precisely this small 
group of households who generate the current volume of transactions and determine the 
current price of housing assets or mortgage debt.  
In a general case where speculation about future prices is allowed, a new-born household 
may choose to own housing asset now, in the future, or never; an owner may choose to 
sell its housing asset at the exiting point or earlier; and a household may own more than 
one unit of housing asset at any point in time. Figure 11 illustrates the decision tree of a 
generation born at time t and lives for three periods in a speculative community. 
B. Financing Home Ownership 
When exit, the wealth (or debt) of each household in a given generation is collected by an 
absentee government and redistributed evenly as endowment among the new-borne 
households. Let Wi,t denotes the real endowment of time t’s generation i, with i = 
0,1,…,T-1, and wi,t the real endowment of each household in this generation, inherited at 
time t-i hence known. By assumption nWw titi ,, = . 
When a household inherits a debt, that debt is financed by borrowing from a single 
absentee financier at a constant risk-free real interest rate rf; when inherits a wealth, the 
wealth is either deposited with this financier to earn a string of payments at the real rate rf, 
or used as a down-payment for the purchase of a housing asset, or invested in another 
risky asset. The other risky asset generates a real return tt rr ε+=~ , with εt a random 
disturbance of zero mean and constant standard deviation, i.e. [ ] 0=tE ε  and [ ] σε =tds .. . 
Assume, without loss of reality in general, that wi,t < Pt. This would force each intended 
owner to take out a mortgage loan from the financier at the rate Mt
MM rr ε+=~ , where 
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[ ] 0=MtE ε and [ ] MMtds σε =..  with rrr Mf <<  and σσ <M , which implies that mortgage 
debt earns a lower rate of return but is less risky than the other risky asset. This assumption is in 
line with the general observation that stocks are riskier but have the potential to generate higher 
returns than housing assets ((David M. Geltner et al., 2007), Exhibit 11-4, p.252).The mortgage 
debt, principle plus interest payments, is fully repaid at the time the house is sold if the 
proceeds from selling the house is large enough; otherwise, it is rolled over and passed 
onto the next new-born generation when the current one exitsviii.  
The demand for mortgage debt is a derived one: it is derived from the demand for 
housing asset. Therefore both the price and volume of housing asset transaction will have 
bearings on the volume of mortgage debt, as will do the borrowing constraint embodied 
in the loan-to-value ratio set by the financier. Furthermore the level of activities in the 
mortgage market will be affected by the opportunity costs of buying a housing asset, 
represented by the real interest rate of mortgage loan and the real rate of return on the 
alternative risky asset ⎯ their respective standard deviations will also have bearings on 
the volume of mortgage debt. Hence ( )tMMfttt LTVrrrQPMM ,,,,,,, σσ= , where M( ) is 
a well behaved implicit function which is continuously differentiable. The subscript t 
denotes the time the measurement is taken, M the new real mortgage issuance, Q the 
transaction volume. By differentiate M with respect to time we obtain an explicit function 
in its dynamic form: 
 
tLTV
M
r
M
r
f
rtQtP
t
VTLMMM
rMrMrMQMPM
M
M
Mf
&&&
&&&&&
&
+++
++++=
σσ σσ
    1 
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where dtdXX =& ; 0>∂∂= QMMQ  by intuition, i.e. the volume of mortgage debt 
increases with the volume of housing asset transactions. When the riskiness of the 
alternative investment asset rises, investing in housing asset becomes more attractive to 
households and the financier is more willing to lend to house-buyers, hence  
.0>∂∂= σσ MM  By the same token, .0<∂∂= MMM M σσ  The marginal impact of 
LTV (or P) on mortgage debt is not as clear-cut as the ones above. If the borrowing 
constraint is binding, an increase in LTV (or P) will relax the constraint hence raise the 
volume of mortgage debt; when it is not binding, the marginal impact of LTV (or P) will 
be zero, i.e. 0≥∂∂= LTVMM LTV (and 0≥∂∂= PMM P  ). The marginal impact of r and 
rf are negative, as an increase in the alternative investment return depresses the supply of 
mortgage loans; but the marginal impact of rM, rMM r ∂∂= , is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, a higher interest rate raises mortgage supply, other things equal; on the other hand, 
it depresses demand. The dynamic equation implies that, other things equal, mortgage 
debt moves in tandem with house price and transaction volume; lower return and greater 
uncertainty in stock market directs speculative money to housing market; and a sudden 
downward jump in house price is likely to trigger a credit crunch. 
By construction, the loan-to-value ratio, the means and standard deviations of the 
investment returns are exogenous to housing and mortgage markets. To single out the 
mechanisms which transmit the forces of speculation backwards and forwards between 
housing and mortgage markets, define an exogenous variable X, with 
{ }σσ ,,,,, MMf rrrLTVX = . Hence 
 ttQtPt XQMPMM &&&& ++=       2 
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C. The Investment Market for Housing Assets 
In a world with perfect information hence the absence of speculation, the expected capital 
gain is zero at all time. The new-born households purchase their housing assets at the 
point of entry or never and all house owners sell their housing asset at the point of exit. In 
such a world, the volume of housing asset transactions, Qt, will be constant over time, 
with Qt = λn; the price, Pt, will fully reflect the value of the housing services and grow in 
line with the rental price, Rt (see subsection 1 below). 
When speculation is introduced with opaque information into this world, the new-born 
to-be-owners may delay buying if they believe the price will fall in the future, and the 
existing owners may sell their housing assets long before they exit if they believe selling 
now is more profitable than in the future. These beliefs in future price changes have no 
economic ground, and are results of sheer information uncertaintyix. If a large enough 
number of owners expect a reduction in future prices, their collective attempt to sell now 
will depress the current price, which may or may not induce an increase in the current 
transaction volume. If a large enough number of future owners believe that buying now is 
more profitable than in the future, their collective attempt to brought forward buying 
plans will drive up the current price, with or without an accompanied increase in volume.  
The volume will go up if home-owners and to-be-owners hold opposite beliefs. In that 
event, the number of buyers will increase simultaneously with the number of sellers. 
When both groups believe in future price falls, buyers withhold buying while sellers try 
to rush out of the market, resulting in a crash in both volume and price. When near the 
trough of a market cycle, both groups believe in future price rises. In this phase, buyers 
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want to buy now but sellers want to sell in the future. Hence an initial price rise is 
accompanied with low transaction volume.      
1. The house price dynamics 
A house asset is somewhat different from the other risky asset mentioned in section B: 
like the latter, it is an investment vehicle; unlike the latter, it generates consumption 
values in the form of a stream of housing services. As a consumption good, the value of a 
house should be reflected by the per-period real rental price (or simply rent), Rt, 
associated with it; as an investment asset, it should be reflected by the real capital value 
(price), Pt, of the house. Barring a prohibitively high transaction cost (financial and 
psychological), in a world with perfect information, cross-section and cross-time 
arbitrage would ensure the present-value of the expected cost of owning equals to the 
present-value of the expected cost of renting in a household’s lifetime. With imperfect 
information, the course of future events is unknown to households. This uncertainty is the 
fundamental source of speculation which has the great potential of destabilizing the 
economy at large.  
Let ζte denotes the time-t expected per-period owner cost associated each pound worth of 
housing capital in its lifetime (for notational simplicity, assume this lifetime spans T 
periods). This owner cost can be decomposed as follows: 
 et
e
ttt
e
t Hop πκδζ −++=        3 
where the superscript e denotes the expected value of the variable, and the subscript t 
denotes the time when these costs occur or the expectation is formed; πHe is the expected 
nominal house price inflation rate; δ the rate of depreciation of housing structures; κ the 
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operation costs and etop  the expected opportunity cost, both associated with this unit of 
housing asset. The operation cost includes property tax and maintenance cost. The 
opportunity cost comes in the form of rate of borrowing if the purchase is financed with a 
mortgage debt, or the return foregone on the best alternative investment opportunity if 
with own funds, or a combination of the two if the sources of funding is of mixed origin. 
For neat notation, assume the mean expected opportunity cost equals r . Further assume 
δ and κ are constant overtime, we can write the above equation as 
 et
e
t Hr πκδζ −++=  
Denote the general inflation rate by π (assume time-invariant), and the expected real 
house price inflation rate by etp& , with ππ −= tet Hp& , then 
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where πκδν −++≡ r . By definition,  
 
t
e
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t P
Pp
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& =         5 
with dtdPP tt ≡&  which is the expected instantaneous real price change at time t. Hence 
 
t
e
tt
t
e
t
e
t
PP
Pp
P
ζν −=
= &
&
        6 
Households optimization would result, in equilibrium (which we assume being 
continuous given the argument in section II), the expected per-period real cost of owning 
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one pound-worth of housing structure, t
e
t Pζ , being equal to the expected per-period real 
value of housing services delivered by that unit of housing structure in its lifetime, the 
latter measured by its associated rent in expectation form, etR . That is 
  ett
e
t RP =ζ        7 
Intuitively, the rental price of housing services is a function of the size of the population, 
the level of housing stock and the income levels of all households involved. In the current 
model, the population is fixed in size, and the income of a household is manifested by its 
endowment. Hence, we can write 
 ( )tTttt WWHRR ,1,0 ,...,, −=       8 
And 
 
( )
1,...1,0
...,,;,...,, ,11,1,011
−=
= −−++−++
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e
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e
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Where e stiW +, is the expected wealth of time t+s’ generation i, i = 0, 1,…, T-1. The partial 
derivatives 0<∂∂=∂∂≡ +e ktetttH HRHRR , with k = 1, 2, …T-1,and 
,,,0,, jiWRWRR tjttitW ∀>∂∂=∂∂≡ which are identical across all households, and 
( )∑−
=
∈∂∂
1
0
.1,0
T
i
iWR  The partial derivatives stipulate that, if W rises by one unit across all 
generations, the rental price of housing services will increase but by less than one-for-one. 
On the other hand, an increase in (expected) housing stock will always drive down the 
rent.  Hence 
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With information uncertainty, the actual price may deviate from its expected value by a 
disturbance: 
 Pt
e
tt uPP +=         11  
In the absence of speculation, the disturbance will have a zero mean on average. When 
speculation is present, it will consist of a time trend and a purely random term 
 ( ) PtPt tu εμ +=         12 
where 0>≡ dtdμμ& , 022 >≡ dtd μμ&& ,and 033 >≡ dtd μμ&&& , i.e. real house price has a 
tendency to deviate from its fundamental value; this deviation is positive on average; the 
rate of this deviation is falling and the speed of this fall increases overtime. This 
specification follows the observation that house prices tends to go way above its 
fundamental value for a sustained period of time. But this tendency is counteracted by a 
mean-reverting force. The purely random term has a zero mean, [ ] 0=PtE ε , and its 
standard deviation, [ ] PtPtds σε =.. , is state dependent: { }PHPLPt σσσ ,∈  with PHPL σσ < . This 
specification captures the fact that house prices are more volatile in some periods than in 
others. The transition from one volatility state to the other is governed by a Markov 
Chain process. Denote the unconditional probability associated with these two states by 
[ ] ρσσ == PLPtPr and [ ] ρσσ −== 1Pr PHPt . In layman’s terms, ρ would be the proportion 
of time we expect to observe a low volatility state if we were to live over a very long 
period of time, without any prior knowledge of the volatility states of the past returns. 
  19 
Denote the conditional probability of a state as [ ]tktttt Ω−−− ;,...,,Pr 21 σσσσ , with k being 
some constant determined by institutions and { }ktttktttt PPPPPP −−−−=Ω &&& ,...,,;,...,, 11  the 
information set available at time t. This conditional probability would be the proportion 
of time we expect to observe certain volatility state with prior knowledge of the past k 
observations. In its simplest form, [ ] [ ]tttttktttt PP &;;Pr;,...,,Pr 121 −−−− =Ω σσσσσσ , we can 
write out the transition probability matrix as  
 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
HHHH
LLLL
HHHL
LHLL
ρρ
ρρ
ρρ
ρρξ
1
1
 
where [ ]ttitjtij PP &;;Pr 1 σσσσρ === − , LHji ,, = , i.e. it is the probability of transiting 
from state i to state j where both i and j can be either high or low volatility state. 
Therefore the dynamics of the price is discontinuous at a time of the transition. Let us 
define a jump process, denoted by J, to capture this discontinuity, with 1=J  at the 
instant of transition, and 0=J otherwise. Hence 
 ( )
( )
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1
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JifttRP
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Where t0 is the time when the price starts to deviate from its fundamental value; β  a 
constant value whose sign is given by Ptσ& . The last term is to capture the observation that 
the longer a price deviates from its fundamental value, the larger the price correction 
when this correction arrives (Qin Xiao, 2010). As will be shown later, to ensure non-
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negative intertemporal equilibrium price, we require μβ &&&< , which amounts to say the 
correction should not be overdone. When 0>tP& , the price is rising. If then 0>Ptσ&  (the 
price switches from a low to high volatility state), there will be an upward jump in the 
price. This is the scenario where the market transit from Phase IV to Phase I (figure 2). In 
transiting from Phase I to II, the volatility of the price decreases, 0<Ptσ&  , and while tP&  
remains positive but the speed of price increase slows down. In moving from Phase II to 
III, the price starts to slide, tP&  turns negative but Ptσ& jumps up again. This increase in 
volatility would put a break to the price slide. Intuitive, rising from a recovery phase, a 
sudden jump in price volatility indicating the arrival of a booming phase and prompting 
the sellers to hold back in anticipation of higher future prices. The price would jump up 
even higher resulting from an extra unsatisfied demand. When an overheated market 
slides into the collapsing phase, sellers would resist sell at a loss hence slow down the 
speed of price dropping. When the price bottoms out from Phase III to IV, its volatility 
decreases while its growth turns positive but slow. Intuitively, households are cautiously 
optimistic at this stage. Table 1 summarizes the above descriptions.  
To transform the implicit function of Rt into an estimable form, take derivatives with 
respect to time, we have 
 ( )JttWRHRPP T
s
T
i
e
W
T
k
ktHtt sti 0
1
0
1
0
1
0
,
−++−−= ∑∑∑ −
=
−
=
−
=
+ + βμν &&&&&&&   14 
Intuitively, trading in the housing asset market by itself is a zero-sum game: one man’s 
gain is another man’s loss. If we assume 0
1
0
=∑−
=
−
T
i
itH&   , i.e. the wealth creation via 
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housing production and the wealth destruction via housing demolition or obsolescence 
cancel out among the T generations of households at any timex, it follows  0
1
0
=∑−
=
T
i
iW& , and  
 ( )JttHRPP T
k
ktHtt 0
1
0
−++−= ∑−
=
+ βμν &&&&&&      15 
A non-zero wealth effect is treated in Appendix B, where wealth changes with the 
accumulation of housing stock; and in Appendix C, where price change or the availability 
of mortgage debt have a real wealth effect. 
2. The dynamics of transaction volumes 
With continuous equilibrium, at anytime the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity 
supplied, both reflected by the transaction volume, tQ . We distinguish housing supply, 
tQ , from housing stock, Ht, as the majority of housing stock is not for trading at any point 
in time. Furthermore, the stock can be altered only through new construction while the 
supply may, in addition, vary with the fraction of existing stock on market. For instance, 
higher than expected price may induce households to put their houses onto the market, an 
action they would not have undertaken had the price behaved more in line with their 
expectations. Conversely, they may withdraw housing unit from the asset market when 
prices are too low by their standards.  
The supply therefore consists of housing units from the existing stock as well as from the 
newly completed ones: 
 ( ) ( ) TfHPEPhPECIQ tfttttltltltt ,...,2,1,, 1 =+= −+−−−   16 
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where ( )I  is the new construction started at time t-l, with l the average period required 
for the completion of a construction project which we take as given. The new 
construction is a function of the time t-l construction costxi and the expected time t price 
with expectation formed at time t-l. The second term in the equation, ( )h , is the housing 
units supplied from the existing stock, which depends on the current price, the expected 
price in the future T periods, as well as the existing stock (excluding the newly added 
ones).  
What about the time t – l expectation of time t price, tlt PE − ? Suppose this expected price 
is higher than the current price plus a transaction cost, i.e. ( ) lttlt PPE −− +> τ1 where τ is 
transaction cost as a fraction of the price, then the expected higher future price will 
immediately push up ltP−  until ( ) lttlt PPE −− += τ1 ; suppose ( ) lttlt PPE −− +< τ1 , this 
expected future price fall will depress the current price immediately until 
( ) lttlt PPE −− += τ1 . By the same argument, ( ) tftt PPE τ+=+ 1 . Hence, we can rewrite the 
above equation as 
 ( ) ( )1,, −−−− += ttltltltt HPhPCIQ      17 
By intuition, ltCII ltltC ,0∀<∂∂≡ −−  and tHhh tH ∀>∂∂≡ 0 , i.e. higher construction 
costs reduces new housing supply whereas higher housing stock increases existing 
housing supply. In the absence of speculation, the partial derivatives ltltP PII −− ∂∂≡ and 
tP Phh ∂∂≡  will be constant with 0, >pP hI , as higher (expected) price implies higher 
(expected) profit, other things equal. With speculation hence price expectation-formation 
becoming necessary, however, their respective sign and magnitude will be state 
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dependent: positive when the price is low and rising, as households take these an 
indication of the coming or arrival of a bull market (Phase IV and I); negative when price 
is very high and still rising, as households grow in unanimity in their expectation for a 
downward price correction (Phase II). In Phase III when the market is collapsing, the 
falling price prompts household loss-aversion, a further reduction in supply therefore a 
positive value in these partial derivatives. The above descriptions of the partial 
derivatives are summarized in table 2. These state-depend partial derivatives capture the 
behaviors of the sellers at different phases of a market cycle. 
In a dynamic world 
 1−−− +++= tHtPltPltCt HhPhPICIQ &&&&&      18 
With 11 −−− = ltt IH& , we can rewrite this equation as 
 1−−− ++= ltHtPltPt IhPhPIQ &&&       19 
Assume tCt ∀= 0& , This can be expressed as a second-order differential equation in Q and 
P only: 
 ( ) 1−−− ++= ltPHtPltPt PIhPhPIQ &&&&&&&  
IV. Analysis of the Dynamic System 
Before looking at the system of three dynamic equations as a whole, recall that 
( )ltltltt PCIIH −−− == ,& . The second-order price differential equation can therefore be 
expressed as a third-order differential equation in price alone. Hence, we have a 
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dynamics system of mortgage debt, house price, and housing transaction volume of the 
following form: 
 XQMPMM tQtPt &&&& =−−  
 ( ) JPIRPP T
k
kltPHtt βμν +=+− ∑−
=
+−
&&&&&&&&&
1
0
   μβ &&&<  
 ( ) 01 =−−− −−− ltPHtPltPt PIhPhPIQ &&&&&&&  
The solution to this system consists of a column vector of particular integrals, 
[ ]′PPP QPM , which represents the intertemporal equilibrium values of the three 
variables in question, and a  vector of complementary functions, [ ]′CCC QPM  , which 
map out the deviation of these variables from the vector of equilibrium values. The 
intertemporal equilibrium of a variable is the path the variable has a tendency to return to, 
hence representing the “gravity pull” of the fundamental forces. However, in the short 
run, the actual path of a variable is also driven by forces other than fundamentals, 
exemplified by the complementary functions. It can be shown (see Appendix A) that if 
( )[ ] 042 <− PH IRν  the variables will behave in a cyclical manner on the way to their 
respective intertemporal equilibrium . The general solution then takes the form 
 ( ) MtAtAeM tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
 ( ) PtBtBeP tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
 ( ) QtCtCeQ tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
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The first term on the right hand side of each equation is the cyclical deviation from its 
corresponding equilibrium; the second term is the intertemporal equilibrium with details 
as follows 
 
( )( )222 TtIRt JP PH+− += ν βμ &
&&&
 
 ( )[ ]PtIhthIQ PHPP 22 ++=  
 ( )[ ]{ } XPttIhhIMMM PHPPQP &++++= 22  
Hence the value of Q and M are all pinned down by the value of P . In Appendix C, it 
will be shown that, when the wealth effect of price and mortgage availability is allowed, 
there will also be a feed back effect of M  on P . In an empirical study using UK data, 
Xiao and Sornette show that the feedback effect of mortgage lending on house price, 
although small, is not statistically insignificant (Qin  Xiao and Didier  Sornette, 2009). 
It can be shown by taking partial derivatives with respect to time that each of these three 
equilibrium values may be an increasing or decreasing function of time. These values 
also jump discontinuously at the transition from one state to another. Furthermore, as PI  
and hp is state dependent, there exist multiple equilibrium time paths. The cyclical 
movement outside an equilibrium is also state dependent because its angular velocity is θ  
radians per unit of time, with ( ) 24
2
1 νθ −= TIR PH (interested reader may refer to 
Nelson et al. (E. W. Nelson et al., 1998) p.243 and p.463 for an explanation of the 
velocity concept). 
  26 
It has been shown that the real root α < 0 is the necessary and sufficient condition for the 
system to be non-explosive (Alpha C. Chiang, 1984). In the current situation, it means we 
require πκδ <++ r , which is equivalent to require the general inflation rate to exceed 
the sum of the rate of housing stock depreciation, the operation cost associated with a 
pound-worth of housing structure, and the mean value of the opportunity cost of buying a 
house. Intuitively, other things equal, a high general inflation rate would reduce the rate 
of real house price inflation hence the growth rate of mortgage debt, making the system 
more sustainable. 
Recall  
 tLTV
M
r
M
r
f
rt VTLMMMrMrMrMX MMf &&&&&&& +++++≡ σσ σσ  
which is exogenous to this system. From section III.B, if the return on the alternative 
assets are higher and less risky, X&  hence M  decreases. Alternatively, if the return on 
mortgage loan is higher and less risky, tX&  hence M  increases. Similarly, an increase in 
the loan-to-value ratio will raise the intertemporal equilibrium value of the mortgage debt. 
The condition ( )[ ] 042 <− TIR PHν  means we require IP < 0, because RH < 0. Recall  IP > 0 
in all phase of a market cycle except for Phase II. Which implies this condition can only 
be satisfied in the over-heating phase of a market cycle. This is puzzling because it is 
unduly restrictive given the observed round-the-cycle cyclicality of price, volume and 
mortgage debt. Putting back the variables which were assumed away, for instance the 
changes in C’s and in W’s, will not vary this conclusion (refer to Appendix B). The 
explanation, at the first glance, seems to lie in the sign of RH. If RH > 0 in Phase I, III and 
IV, the puzzle is then resolved. But how do we reconcile this oddity with economic 
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intuitions? Although we do observe rental prices increase whilst housing stocks are on 
the rise in a booming market, basic economics and statistics would tell us this observation 
merely establishes a correlation rather than a causation relation between the two variables. 
That is, other forces might be at play which have up-shifted the demand schedule for 
rental housing, meanwhile these same forces have also resulted in a higher level of 
housing stock. 
V. Conclusion 
The most recent boom and bust in housing and mortgage markets in many developed 
countries have ignited renewed interests, among academics and policy makers, in forces 
behind this periodic phenomenon. Such interests are manifested by a call for “Study on 
housing markets and intra-euro area macroeconomic imbalances – identifying policy 
instruments” by European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, and by the number of sessions and panel discussion devoted to this topic in 17th 
Annual ERES Conference (Milan, 2010).  
Despite of the great efforts made by academics and policy makers, the boom and bust 
cycles in housing and mortgage markets seem to grow more spectacular and more 
destructive to the general economic well-being. The duration and magnitude of these 
booms and busts are beyond the explanations of economic fundamentals, such as income, 
interest rate and population growths.  
The objective of the current study is to argue, facilitated with a system of dynamic 
models, that certain characteristics of household behavior in an uncertain environment 
can greatly affect the forces of demand and supply, and especially supply, hence prices 
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and activities in housing and mortgage markets. The construction of the model follows 
the line of thoughts in the theory of revealed preferences. Unlike the majority of studies 
in this area which derives the observables (price and quantity) from the un-observables 
(households behavior), this paper takes a reverse route. It infers, from the characteristics 
of the growths in the observable prices and transaction volumes, the unobservable 
parameters of households’ behavior. It is motivated by the most fundamental economic 
equilibrium concept, first in a static sense. This equilibrium concept is then extended to a 
dynamic world where both fundamentals and speculative forces prevail. It concludes that 
the observed boom and bust cycles are results of a continued battle between the two 
forces, which take turn to dominate. This battle is manifested by a tendency of the 
variables in concern to deviate, in a cyclical manner, from their respective intertemporal 
equilibrium; but that tendency is countered by a mean reverting force which exerts its 
influence both continuously and in jumps.  
The model constructed captured a number of stylized facts of the markets: the non-
linearity and cyclicality of growths in house price, volume and mortgage debt; the co-
movements among these variables and the characteristics of such co-movements; the fact 
that lower return and greater uncertainty in stock market directs speculative money to 
housing market; and the observation that credit crunch is typically associated with a 
sudden drop in house price. The non-linear relationship is modeled with state-dependent 
coefficients. This model also generates some testable implications, for instance, the 
stability of the system. 
When the wealth effect of price and mortgage debt is taken into account (Appendix C), 
this model will allow not only house prices to determine the level of mortgage debt, but 
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also a feedback effect of mortgage availability on house prices. Xiao and Sornette (Qin  
Xiao and Didier  Sornette, 2009) show, using UK data (1975Q1 to 2007Q3) and a two-
state Markov switching model, that while house price has a large impact on the growth of 
mortgage debt (roughly 2% growth in mortgage debt for every 1%  growth in house price 
over five quarters), the feedback effect of mortgage debt on house price is small (about 
0.1%  in house price for every 1% in mortgage debt over four quarters), but not 
statistically insignificant. 
This theoretical framework can be adopted for use by market participants and policy 
makers alike. For the former group of economic agents whose objective is profit 
maximization, the model is usable for market forecasts ⎯ not only in housing but also in 
commercial real estate markets, as similar economic forces rule both worlds. For the 
second group of economic agents whose objective is to avoid short-term growth from 
damaging long-term economic stability, a straightforward application of this model is to 
use the stability condition to test the sustainability of a market boom. This condition 
should be refined when expanding the dynamic system to endogenize the policy 
instruments, such as interest rate and loan-to-value ratio. By endogenizing these policy 
instruments, it enables the design of an optimal mechanism for smooth government 
policy responses. A continuous smooth response to market moves, the author argue, is 
less likely to generate disproportionate jumps in the market hence likely to be destructive 
to markets (refer to (Ahmet Duran, 2006, Ahmet Duran and Gunduz Caginalp, 2005, 
2007, Qin Xiao and Weihong Huang, 2010) on discussions of market over-reactions to 
shocks). A lesson of this kind of smooth policy response might be learnt from the foreign 
exchange rate management by the government of Singapore which, partly because of that, 
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survived almost unscathed one of the most severe financial crisis of Southeast Asian in 
the late 1990s (see (Sheng-Yi1 Lee, 1984) for more discussion on this exchange 
management). 
This model may also be extended by replacing the deterministic with stochastic 
differential equations. This may be of greater value for assets which are traded much 
more frequently, such as REITs. Whichever the avenue of expansion, the central message 
delivered by this model should not be fundamentally altered: there are three-way dynamic 
interactions, via fundamental and speculative forces, among house price, transaction 
volume and mortgage debt; and their mutual impacts vary with the phase of a housing 
market cycle. 
 
(7222 words excluding endnotes, bibliography, graphs and tables, and Appendices) 
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Figure 1 US home sales in unit thousands and as percentage of housing stock. Source: (CEIC Database) 
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Figure 2 Stylized facts on the co-movement of price and transaction volume in housing asset market. 
The colors depicts different phases of a market cycle: in the green (recovery) phase, price and volume pick 
up after being stagnant; in the red phase, the increase in price and volume are gathering speed; in the purple  
(over-heating) phase, price continue to rise while volume dries out; in the black (crash) phase, price drops  
sharply which is coupled with a selling frenzy. 
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Figure 3 Observed price and transaction volume co-movement in US (Jan 99 – Apr 10), England and 
Wales (Jan 95 – Feb 10).  The observations above seem to confirm the stylized fact: low transaction 
volume is associated with both high and low prices (Source: CEIC Database). 
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Figure 4 A disequilibrium explanation of the housing market cycle. 
 
 
Figure 5 A continuous equilibrium explanation of the housing market cycle. 
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Figure 6 House price and transaction volume in the four phases of a housing market cycle 
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Figure 7 House price, sales volume and mortgage outstanding (Jan 96 – Feb 10). Source: Land Registry 
website (house price and sales) and Bank of England (net lending secured by home), both accessed on 18th 
June 2010. 
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Figure 8 US house price, sales volume and mortgage outstanding (Jan 00 – Mar 10). Source: CEIC 
Database. 
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Figure 9 Housing Market and Mortgage Market (adopted from Buckley (1982)).
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Figure 10 An example of stationary state demographic and housing tenure distribution at time t 
when speculation is absent. 
 
 
Figure 11 The decision tree of a household borne at time t and lived for three periods when 
speculation about future price was allowed. 
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Table 1 Price Growth and Price Volatility 
 0>P&  0<P&  
Sign(β)  
= σ&  
> 0 
Phase IV Î Phase I 
Upward jump in P 
 
(sellers waiting for higher price) 
Phase II Î Phase III 
Price slides but slow 
 
(seller loss aversion) 
Sign(β)  
= σ&  
< 0 
Phase IÎ Phase II 
Phase IIIÎ Phase IV 
Slow price growth  
 
(growing unanimity in expectation 
for price correction) 
 
 
Table 2 Marginal Impact of Price on New and Existing Supply 
 0>P& & high 0>P&  & low 0<P& & low 
P high Phase II 
0, <IIPIIP hI  
 
(growing unanimity in expecting downward price 
correction) 
P low Phase I 
0, >IPIP hI  
 
(burgeoning  optimism) 
Phase IV 
0, >IVPIVP hI  
 
(Growing unanimity 
in expecting upward 
price correction) 
Phase III 
0, >IIIPIIIP hI  
 
(loss aversion and a 
collapsing supply in 
a falling market) 
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Appendix A 
Solving the System of Differential Equations 
Given the dynamic system 
 XQMPMM tQtPt &&&& =−−  
 ( ) JPIRPP T
k
e
kltPHtt βμν +=+− ∑−
=
+−
&&&&&&&&&
1
0
  3μβ <  
 ( ) 01 =−−− −−− ltPHtPltPt PIhPhPIQ &&&&&&&  
At time t, there is no reason to believe that the dynamics of the price will behave 
differently in the future, hence t
e
klt PP && =+− . The solution to which consists of two parts: a 
vector of particular integrals and a vector of complementary functions. 
VI. Finding the vector of particular integrals 
Following the method described by Chiang (Alpha C. Chiang, 1984), try tMM P = , 
3
3
tPPP = , 22 t
QQP = . We therefore have the intertemporal equilibrium values: 
 
( )( )222 TtIRt JP PH+− += ν βμ &
&&&
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22
2
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TtIRt
JtIhthI
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++=
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 ( )[ ]{ }
( )[ ]{ } ( )( ) XTtIRt JttIhhIMM
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XQtMPtM
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PHPPQP
PHPPQP
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&&
&&&
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++−
++++=
++++=
++=
2
2
2
2
22
2
2
ν
βμ
 
It can be shown by taking partial derivatives with respect to time that each of these three 
equilibrium values may be an increasing or decreasing function of time. These values 
also jump discontinuously at the transition from one state to another. The jumping 
parameter β can be negative as well as positive. As will be shown in the next section, in 
order for the system to eventually converge to its intertemporal equilibrium, we require  
0<ν . Together with the condition 03 >μ and 3μβ < , we can ensure the intertemporal 
value of the price to be non-negative. Furthermore, as PI  and hp is state dependent, there 
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exist multiple equilibrium time paths for each of the three variables in this partial 
dynamic system. For a stable equilibrium, we require the related complementary function 
to map out a convergent time path. 
VII. Finding the vector of complementary functions 
Following Chiang, try tC AeM
η= , tC BeP η= , and tC CeQ η= , where A, B and C are 
arbitrary constants which can be definitized with boundary conditions. Substitutes these 
trial solutions and their respective derivatives into the reduced (homogenous) equations: 
 0=−− tQtPt CeMBeMAe ηηη ηηη  
 ( ) 023 =+− tPHtt BeTIRBeBe ηηη ηνηη  
 ( ) ( ) 022 =−+− tPHtPPt BeIhBehICe ηηη ηηη  
Simplify 
 0=−− CMBMA QP  
 ( )[ ] 02 =+− BTIR PHνηη  
 ( ) ( )[ ] 0=++− BIhhIC PHPP ηη  
Write in matrix form 
  
 ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
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0
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MM
PHPP
PH
QP
ηη
νηη  
For non-trivial solutions of A, B and C, we require 
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which is called the characteristic equation of the system of dynamic equations. Simplify 
to  
 ( ) 02 =+− TIR PHνηη  
and solve for the pair of characteristic roots 21,ηη  
 ( )TIR PH42
1
2
1, 221 −±= ννηη  
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To have the observed cyclical patterns of time path, we require ( )[ ] 042 <− TIR PHν , i.e. 
the characteristic roots are a pair of conjugate complex numbers. In that case, we can 
write the above solution as 
 ( ) iiTIR PH θαννηη ±≡−±= 221 42
1
2
1,  
where 1−=i , which is an imaginary number; να
2
1= , the real root; and 
( ) iTIRi PH 242
1 νθ −=  the imaginary root which is state-dependent because of Ip. Hence 
the complementary functions: 
 ( )tAtAeeAeAM ttittitC θθαθαθα sincos 4321 +=+= −+  
 ( )tBtBeeBeBP ttittitC θθαθαθα sincos 4321 +=+= −+  
 ( )tCtCeeCeCQ ttittitC θθαθαθα sincos 4321 +=+= −+  
where 2,1,,, =jCBA jjj  are arbitrary constants to be definitized with boundary 
conditions; 213 XXX +≡ and ( )iXXX 214 −≡  with jjjj CBAX ,,= and j = 1, 2, 3,4.  
VIII. The general solution 
Combine the particular integral with the complex functions we have the general solution: 
 ( ) MtAtAeM tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
 ( ) PtBtBeP tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
 ( ) QtCtCeQ tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
For these variables to converge to their respective intertemporal equilibrium, we require 
the real root α < 0. That implies the condition for this dynamic system to be non-
explosive is 0<−++≡ πκδν r , which is equivalent to require πκδ <++ r . 
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Appendix B 
Solving the System of Differential Equations 
⎯ Wealth effect with growing housing stock 
Without the restriction 0
1
0
=∑−
=
T
i
iW& , we have 
 ( )JttWRHRPP T
s
T
i
e
W
T
k
ktHtt sti 0
1
0
1
0
1
0
,
−++−−= ∑∑∑ −
=
−
=
−
=
+ + βμν &&&&&&&  
By construction of the model, changes in W& only result from accumulation of housing 
wealth H& , i.e. ∑∑ −
=
−
−
=
=
1
0
1
0
T
i
it
T
i
i HW && . Since ltt IH −=& , we have ∑∑ −
=
−−
−
=
=
1
0
1
0
T
i
lit
T
i
i IW& . Therefore  
 JPIRPIRPP
T
s
T
i
e
stlitPW
T
k
e
kltPHtt βμν ++−−= ∑∑∑ −
=
−
=
+−−
−
=
+−
&&&&&&&&&&
1
0
1
0
,
1
0
 
That gives the dynamic system 
 XQMPMM tQtPt &&&& =−−  
 ( ) JPIRPP T
s
T
i
e
stlitPHtt βμν +=+− ∑∑−
=
−
=
+−−
&&&&&&&&&
1
0
1
0
,   3μβ <  
 ( ) 01 =−−− −−− ltPHtPltPt PIhPhPIQ &&&&&&&  
The solution to which consists of two parts: a vector of particular integrals and a vector of 
complementary functions. 
IX. Finding the vector of particular integrals 
Following the method described by Chiang (Alpha C. Chiang, 1984), try tMM P = , 
3
3
tPPP = , 22 t
QQP = . We therefore have the intertemporal equilibrium values: 
 
( )( )212 TtIRt JP PH+− += ν βμ &
&&&
 
 ( )[ ]
( )[ ]( )( )22
2
12
2
2
TtIRt
JtIhthI
PtIhthI
Q
PH
PHPP
PHPP
+−
+++=
++=
ν
βμ &&&&
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 ( )[ ]{ }
( )[ ]{ } ( )( ) XTtIRt JttIhhIMM
XPttIhhIMM
XQtMPtM
M
PH
PHPPQP
PHPPQP
QP
&&
&&&
&
&
++−
++++=
++++=
++=
2
2
2
2
12
2
2
ν
βμ
 
X. Finding the vector of complementary functions 
Following Chiang, try tC AeM
η= , tC BeP η= , and tC CeQ η= , where A, B and C are 
arbitrary constants which can be definitized with boundary conditions. Substitutes these 
trial solutions and their respective derivatives into the reduced (homogenous) equations: 
 0=−− tQtPt CeMBeMAe ηηη ηηη  
 ( ) 0223 =+− tPHtt BeTIRBeBe ηηη ηνηη  
 ( ) ( ) 022 =−+− tPHtPPt BeIhBehICe ηηη ηηη  
Simplify 
 0=−− CMBMA QP  
 ( )[ ] 022 =+− BTIR PHνηη  
 ( ) ( )[ ] 0=++− BIhhIC PHPP ηη  
Write in matrix form 
  
 ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
=
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
++−
+−
−−
0
0
0
0
020
1
2
C
B
A
IhhI
TIR
MM
PHPP
PH
QP
ηη
νηη  
For non-trivial solutions of A, B and C, we require 
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which is called the characteristic equation of the system of dynamic equations. Simplify 
to  
 ( ) 022 =+− TIR PHνηη  
and solve for the pair of characteristic roots 21,ηη  
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 ( )TIR PH82
1
2
1, 221 −±= ννηη  
To have the observed cyclical patterns of time path, we require ( )[ ] 082 <− TIR PHν , i.e. 
the characteristic roots are a pair of conjugate complex numbers. In that case, we can 
write the above solution as 
 ( ) iiTIR PH θαννηη ±≡−±= 221 82
1
2
1,  
where 1−=i , which is an imaginary number; να
2
1= , the real root; and 
( ) iTIRi PH 282
1 νθ −=  the imaginary root which is state-dependent because of Ip. Hence 
the complementary functions: 
 ( )tAtAeeAeAM ttittitC θθαθαθα sincos 4321 +=+= −+  
 ( )tBtBeeBeBP ttittitC θθαθαθα sincos 4321 +=+= −+  
 ( )tCtCeeCeCQ ttittitC θθαθαθα sincos 4321 +=+= −+  
where 2,1,,, =jCBA jjj  are arbitrary constants to be definitized with boundary 
conditions; 213 XXX +≡ and ( )iXXX 214 −≡  with jjjj CBAX ,,= and j = 1, 2, 3,4.  
XI. The general solution 
Combine the particular integral with the complex functions we have the general solution: 
 ( ) MtAtAeM tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
 ( ) PtBtBeP tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
 ( ) QtCtCeQ tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
For these variables to converge to their respective intertemporal equilibrium, we require 
the real root α < 0. That implies the condition for this dynamic system to be non-
explosive is 0<−++≡ πκδν r , which is equivalent to require πκδ <++ r . 
 
  46 
Appendix C 
Solving the System of Differential Equations 
⎯ With wealth effect of price and mortgage loan 
 
In a general case, changes in house price and the availability of mortgage loan may have 
real wealth effect: 
 MWPWYWW MPY &&&& ++=  
where Y is a vector of exogenous variables, such as income and inheritance outside, 
which affect the endowment of households in this economy; PWP &  and MWM &  are the 
wealth effect of price change and mortgage availability. Then 
 
( )Jtt
MWRPWRYWRIRPP
WRHRPP
MWPWYWH
WH
0−+=
++++−=
++−
∑∑∑∑∑∑∑
∑∑∑
βμ
ν
ν
&&
&&&&&&
&&&&&
 
And 
 ∑∑
∑∑∑∑∑
−+=
+++−
YWRJ
MWRPWRPIRPP
YW
MWPWPH
&&&&&
&&&&&&&&&&
βμ
ν
 
That gives the dynamic system 
 XQMPMM tQtPt &&&& =−−  
 ∑∑
∑∑∑∑∑
−+=
+++−
YWRJ
MWRPWRPIRPP
YW
MWPWPH
&&&&&
&&&&&&&&&&
βμ
ν
   
 ( ) 01 =−−− −−− ltPHtPltPt PIhPhPIQ &&&&&&&  
The solution to which consists of two parts: a vector of particular integrals and a vector of 
complementary functions. 
XII. Finding the vector of particular integrals 
Following the method described by Chiang (Alpha C. Chiang, 1984), try 2
2
tMM P = , 
3
3
tPPP = , 22 t
QQP = . We therefore have the intertemporal equilibrium values: 
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( )
( )( ) ( )( )( ) MTtIRtWTR WTRTtIRtWTR YWRJP PHPW MWPHPW YW ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+−−−⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+−−
−+= ∑∑ 22 222 2222 νν βμ
&&&&&&
 
 ( )[ ]PtIhthIQ PHPP 22 ++=  
 
t
XQMPtMM QP
&++=  
XIII. Finding the vector of complementary functions 
Following Chiang (Alpha C. Chiang, 1984), try tC AeM
η= , tC BeP η= , and tC CeQ η= , 
where A, B and C are arbitrary constants which can be definitized with boundary 
conditions. Substitutes these trial solutions and their respective derivatives into the 
reduced (homogenous) equations: 
 0=−− tQtPt CeMBeMAe ηηη ηηη  
 ( ) 02223 =+++− ∑∑∑∑∑ tMWtPWtPHtt AeWRBeWRBeIRBeBe ηηηηη ηηηνηη  
 ( ) ( ) 022 =−+− tPHtPPt BeIhBehICe ηηη ηηη  
Simplify 
 0=−− CMBMA QP  
 [ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 022 2 =+−−+ BITRWTRAWTR PHPWMW ηνηη  
 ( ) ( )[ ] 0=+++− CBIhhI PHPP ηη  
Write in matrix form 
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0
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2
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A
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For non-trivial solutions of A, B and C, we require 
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which is called the characteristic equation of the system of dynamic equations. Simplify 
to  
 ( ) ( ) 022 =+−− PHPW ITRWTR ηνη  
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and solve for the pair of characteristic roots 21,ηη  
 ( ) ( ) ( )PHPWPW ITRWTRWTR 422
12
2
1, 221 −−±−= ννηη  
To have the observed cyclical patterns of time path, we require 
 ( ) ( )PHPW ITRWTR 42 2 <−ν  
i.e. the characteristic roots are a pair of conjugate complex numbers. In that case, we can 
write the above solution as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) iiWTRITRWTR PWPHPW θαννηη +≡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−±−= 221 242
12
2
1,  
where 1−=i , which is an imaginary number; ( )PWWTR22
1 −= να , the real root; and 
( ) ( ) iWTRITRi PWPH ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−= 224
2
1 νθ  the imaginary root which is state-dependent 
because of Ip. Hence the complementary functions: 
 ( )tAtAeeAeAM ttittitC θθαθαθα sincos 4321 +=+= −+  
 ( )tBtBeeBeBP ttittitC θθαθαθα sincos 4321 +=+= −+  
 ( )tCtCeeCeCQ ttittitC θθαθαθα sincos 4321 +=+= −+  
where 2,1,,, =jCBA jjj  are arbitrary constants to be definitized with boundary 
conditions; 213 XXX +≡ and ( )iXXX 214 −≡  with jjjj CBAX ,,= and j = 1, 2, 3,4.  
XIV. The general solution 
Combine the particular integral with the complex functions we have the general solution: 
 ( ) MtAtAeM tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
 ( ) PtBtBeP tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
 ( ) QtCtCeQ tt ++= θθα sincos 43  
For these variables to converge to their respective intertemporal equilibrium, we require 
the real root α < 0. That implies the condition for this dynamic system to be non-
explosive is PWWTR2<ν . 
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i Housing is the single most important asset for most households in countries where middle-class forms the 
backbone of the economy. For instance, in the US, more than 40% of household assets are in the form of 
housing, c.f. Curcuru, Stephanie; Heaton, John; Lucas, Deborah and Moore, Damien eds. 
Heterogeneity and Portfolio Choice: Theory and Evidence. 2004. 
ii The adjective “ordinary” is attached to exclude things such as saffron or articles worn by some influential 
historical figures.   
iii Accessible at http://www.communities.gov.uk. 
iv Total housing sales as a percentage of the housing stock has been consistently below 1% in the USA and 
below 6% in UK between 1999 and 2010 (see US Census Bureau website for data on USA and 
Communities and Local Government web site on UK housing statistics). 
v A bottom-up approach is the piecing together of systems to give rise to grander systems. On the other 
hand, in a top-down approach, an overview of the system is first formulated. 
vi In dynamic analysis, a stationary state is a state where each relevant variable grows at a zero rate, i.e. 
each is at its intertemporal equilibrium. A related concept is steady state where all relevant variables grow 
at an identical rate. 
vii In the most general case, λ will be a function of the relative cost of owning versus renting. In this model, 
we put the tenure choice problem at the background by assuming an exogenously given constant-value λ. 
This will allow us to single out the price impact of timing house buying or selling, a result of speculation 
through price expectation formation. Those who are interested in the specific treatment of a tenure choice 
problem are referred to Sinai, Todd and Souleles, Nicholas. "Owner-Occupied Housing as a Hedge 
against Rent Risk." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005, May, pp. 763-89. and Ortalo-Magné, 
Francois and Rady, Sven. "Tenure Choice and the Riskiness of Non-Housing Consumption." Journal of 
Housing Economics, 2002, 11(3), pp. 266-79. 
viii The sustainability of borrowing into infinite future is taken for granted in this model. 
ix In the real world, such beliefs sometimes do have sound economic ground but are often greatly distorted 
as a result of opaque information, and as a result of uncertainty regarding the implication of a given piece 
of information. For instance, over-heating in housing market often triggers government intervention ⎯ that 
many people know. What form that intervention will take is unknown to most beforehand. The exact 
impact of a given intervening policy will be unknown even to the policy maker himself, as that will depend 
on the complex interaction of all economic agents affected. A famous military analogue is described by 
Tolstoy in War and Peace regarding the role of Napoleon in the Battle of Borodino.   
x Refer to section II of this paper for the scenarios under which this assumption may be valid. 
xi More general, 11,...,, −+−− tltlt CCC  should all enter as arguments in the ( )I  function as these past costs 
may affect the expected costs between the time the construction starts, t-l, and the time it completes, t. The 
choice of l will be a bit involved in empirical studies. The actual construction time for a residential housing 
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varies greatly and can take from as little as two months to as much as two years (see 
http://www.b4ubuild.com/resources/schedule/6kproj.shtml and http://nwjoinery.com/budget.htm. Both 
accessed on 4th July 2010. Also refer to Skitmorea, R. Martin   and Ng, S. Thomas. "Forecast Models 
for Actual Construction Time and Cost " Building and Environment, 2003, 38(8), pp. 1075-83.). 
